ABSTRACT With the rapid development of wireless network infrastructure and transportation industry, vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) have been paid more and more attention. Meanwhile, proxy mobile IPv6(PMIPv6), with its shorter handover delay and lower signaling overhead, is an ideal mobility management approach to exploit the advantages of VANETs. However, security issues become the main obstacle for the combination of PMIPv6 and VANETs. Unfortunately, most scholars' research focus on the efficiency and security during access authentication of vehicle node, while ignoring the privacy issues which may cause great impact on mobile users. In this paper, we put forward an anonymous authentication scheme based on PMIPv6 for VANETs. The scheme is equipped with pseudonyms, identity-based cryptographic mechanisms, and several salient authentication protocols. According to the security and performance analysis, the proposed scheme owns higher security and efficiency compared with the typical ones.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the rapid development of vehicular ad-hoc networks(VANETs) has witnessed the booming Intelligent Transportation System(ITS) whether in traffic control or mobile entertainment [1] . However, in the course of high-speed movement, how to ensure the consistency and reliability of the communication has become a severe issue for VANETs. To this end, IETF suggests mobile IPv6 [2] which guarantees the pervasive mobile devices can always be accessed regardless of their location and movement status. As the extension of mobile IPv6, proxy mobile IPv6(PMIPv6) [3] is proposed to simplify the network's control and reduces users' participation in mobility management process. Meanwhile, due to shorter handover delay and lower signaling overhead, the focus on the combination of PMIPv6 and VANETs becomes increasingly popular [4] .
However, in order to pave the road for the facilitation of PMIPv6 in VANETs, ensuring the privacy and communication security of the network entities has become an urgent issue [5] . In scheme [6] - [8] , mutual authentication between PMIPv6 entities should be involved with AAA server. Reference [6] presents an authentication scheme for PMIPv6 based on Diameter protocol. This scheme depends on shared key among AAA, MN, LMA, and MAG to ensure the security of authentication. However, [6] does not show the implementation details and can not resist brute-force attacks. Reference [7] also utilizes Diameter and PANA to achieve mutual authentication in PMIPv6 network. Nevertheless, there are too much message to be exchanged among entities, which results longer authentication delay. An authentication scheme based on certificateless signcryption mechanism is proposed by [8] with lower computation overhead and key management burden, but similar as [6] - [8] also suffers from the high authentication delay since the authentication signalling needs to be transmitted over long distance. Furthermore, the scheme suffers from the problem of packet loss [9] . In order to address the above issues, the local authentication schemes are proposed [10] - [14] . Song and Han [10] present an authentication scheme based on one-time key, which is generated by specific timestamp. Kerberos [11] , as an authentication service for distributed environment, makes entities to obtain multiple service by issuing ID and key. However, when changing access point, MN has to provide the network service privilege, which reduces the authentication efficiency. Reference [12] provides an authentication mechanism based on tickets to optimize the handover authentication process.
In [12] , as long as MN holds the ticket, even if changing the access point, MN can still prove itself to be a legal entity. In 2013, Kim and Lee [13] proposed a Diffie-Hellmankey-based authentication scheme, which exploits the lowerlevel signallings to exchange the Diffie-Hellman parameters. When MN handovers across different domains, lower authentication delay is produced. Furthermore, high calculating cost exists in generating session keys, which influences the handover efficiency. Reference [14] is then proposed based on elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman mechanism, which owes shorter key, lower computation overhead, and handover delay.
Moreover, how to guarantee the privacy of vehicle nodes is very crucial for VANETs. In the above schemes, vehicle node's true identity is required to be exposed to external completely during mutual authentication, which violates the anonymity requirement. For one thing, once user's real identity is exposed, adversary may trace the user or take part in the users' sessions. For another, misusing and impersonation may happen easily. In order to solve the above problem, [15] - [17] put forward the way of using pseudonym to guarantee the privacy of vehicle nodes. Reference [15] utilizes the no certificate public key system to achieve local authentication which reduces the authentication delay caused by the transmission of information. However, the proposed scheme requires vehicles to have sufficient computing power during anonymous access authentication, which puts forward higher computing ability for vehicles. Reference [16] introduces a batch verification process in V2I communications. During access authentication, each vehicle has to consume a great deal of computational cost, which may cause bottleneck at vehicle. Reference [17] also uses the elliptic curve based on algorithm to protect vehicle node's true identity. Nevertheless, the involvement of Certification Center results in more transmission delay, and influences authentication efficiency.
On the basis of summarizing existing schemes, we introduce an anonymous authentication scheme based on PMIPv6 for vehicular network(AAS). The proposed scheme consists of three phases: system initialization, entity registration, as well as anonymous authentication. The hierarchical architecture ensures that the division of each entity is clear and reduces the computation and authentication costs. The group IBS mechanism preserves the privacy of the related entities during the authentication procedures. Moreover, the formal security proof based on SVO shows that the proposed scheme is robust. Finally, the performance analysis demonstrates that the scheme owns higher authentication efficiency than the typical ones.
The remainder of this paper is organized as below. Section 2 introduces the concepts and cryptographic preliminaries involved in the scheme. The proposed scheme is established and elaborated in Section 3. In Section 4, the formal security proof and analysis of the core protocols in our scheme are given. Performance analysis is presented in Section 5. Finally, we provide a concluding remark in Section 6. 
II. PRELIMINARIES A. VANETs
VANETs is a special wireless ad-hoc network, which provides communication service for Vehicle-to-Vehicle(V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure(V2I) scenarios [18] . For V2V, VANETs can ensure that vehicles may communicate directly without the participation of the network infrastructure. As an important part of ITS, the main goal of VANETs is to guarantee the security and efficiency. VANETs includes three kinds of entities: Trust Authority(TA), Roadside Unit(RSU), and On-Board Unit(OBU). TA is charge of the registration of RSU and OBU. RSU is installed on both sides of the road. As a providing communication service equipment for OBU, RSU has the function including vehicle identification, electronic deduction etc. OBU is configured into vehicle and is responsible for supplying wireless communication service.
B. PMIPv6
As a network-based mobility management protocol, PMIPv6 protocol warrants that the mobile node(MN) does not need to change the initial configuration of the network interface to complete the handover. Proxy mobile entity is designed to assist MN to complete the process of mobility management so that MN can gain the service without having to support mobility management protocol. As shown in Figure 1 , In PMIPv6, Local Mobility Anchor (LMA) and Mobility Access Gate (MAG) are introduced as two new entities within the PMIPv6 domain. MAG is implemented on the access router, which is responsible for detecting the movement of MN and performing the mobility management on behalf of MN. The pressure of MN is thus alleviated. LMA is equivalent to mobile IPv6 home agent, which is in change of maintaining MN's reachability state and establishing bidirectional tunnel between LMA and MAG to forward data packets.
C. MATHEMATICAL FOUNDATIONS 1) BILINEAR PAIRING
Let G 1 be a cyclic additive group of prime order q generated by P, and G T be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order. Let a bilinear pairing e : G 1 × G 1 − → G T satisfy the following properties. VOLUME 6, 2018 (1) Bilinear: For any P, Q ∈ G 1 and a, b ∈ Z * q , e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q) ab ;
(2) Non-degenerate: There exists P, Q ∈ G 1 , such that e(P, Q) = I G T , where I G T is the generator of G T ; (3) Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to calculate e(P, Q), for all P, Q ∈ G 1 .
Bilinear pairing can be deduced by Weil pairing or Tate pairing on hyper-singular elliptic curves or hyper-singular hyper-elliptical curves over finite fields [19] .
2) MATEMATICAL PROBLEMS
The followings are the mathematical difficulties involved in the proposed scheme.
(1) Discrete logarithm Problem(DLP): Given two elements P, Q ∈ G 1 , to find an integer n ∈ Z * q , such that Q = nP whenever such an integer exists.
(2) Computation Diffie-Hellman Problem(CDHP): Given P, aP, bP ∈ G 1 , where a, b ∈ Z * q , it is difficult to calculate abP.
(3) Decision Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDHP): It is difficult to decide whether c = ab mod P for given (P, aP, bP, cP), where a, b, c ∈ Z * q .
D. IDENTITY -BASED GROUP SIGNATURE(IBGS)
Group signature is first proposed by Chaum and van Heijst [20] , which allows the group members to sign the message on behalf of the entire group while the signer's identity is confidential. Any entity can verify the signature without knowing the identity of the signer. The group signature guarantees the signer's anonymity. The group IBS(IBGS) [21] used in this paper has outstanding performance in terms of efficiency and security. The details are described as below. IBGS.Setup: PKG selects a cycle additive group G 1 and a cycle multiplicative group G T generated by prime q respectively, bilinear pairing e: G 1 × G 1 − → G T , the generator of G 1 : P, and two hash functions:
PKG chooses a random number s ∈ Z * q , calculates P pub = sP. The system public parameters
IBGS.Extract: User randomly selects r ∈ Z * q as his/her long-term private key and sends rP and his/her ID to PKG. PKG calculates S ID = sQ ID = sH 2 (ID||T , rP) based on the parameters obtained from user. S ID is returned to user through a secure tunnel, where T is the valid period of r. User's private key pair is < r, S ID >, and the public key is his/her ID.
IBGS.StandardSign: In order to sign Message M ∈ {0, 1} * , the signer firstly chooses a ∈ Z * q randomly, and computes the following values.
Then the signature δ = (U , V , W , T , rP) and M will be sent to the verifier.
IBGS.StandardVerify:
The verifier first checks whether T is fresh, if yes, the verifier calculates Q = H 2 (ID||T , rP), 
Then signer sends the signature δ = (U , V , W , T , rx i P) and M to the verifier.
IBGS.Verify:
After receiving the signature δ and M , the verifier first checks whether T is fresh, if yes, the verifier calcu-
In the proposed scheme, IBGS is conducted for the anonymous authentication between MN and MAG
E. SHORT SIGNATURE(BLS)
In 2001, a short signature scheme(BLS [22] ) based on bilinear pairing was proposed, which is simple and efficient. The scheme is expressed as follows.
BLS.Setup: PKG selects cycle additive group G 1 , cycle multiplicative group G T generated by prime q, a bilinear mapping e :
BLS.Extract: User randomly selects r ∈ Z * q as the longterm private key and calculates the corresponding public key P pub = rP.
BLS.Sign: For message M ∈ {0, 1} * , the signer generates the signature as: V = rH (M ).
BLS.Verify: In order to verify the signature V , the verifier checks whether e(P pub , H (M )) == e(P, V ) is satisfied. If yes, V is valid, otherwise V is invalid.
In the propose scheme, BLS will be used to generate signatures for MN under the premise of anonymity, during mutual authentication.
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
A. NETWORK ARCHITECTURE Figure 2 shows the network architecture of the proposed scheme, which is divided into four layers. The first layer is the System-level Trust Root (STR). As a trusted third party, STR generates public parameters and issues the private key for other entities. Besides, as the group manager, STR also issues the corresponding group certificate for the legal MN through the identity-based group signature mechanism. The second layer is LMA, which is responsible for the mobility management of MN, and helps MN to generate the variable pseudonyms. The third layer contains MAG, which is deployed along roads as RSU, and is in charge of mutual authentication with the accessed MN. The fourth layer consists of MN. As a vehicle node, MN can roam from home network to foreign network.
B. TRUST MODEL
In terms of the hierarchical network architecture, we present the trust model among network entities: STR, LMA, MAG, and MN as shown in Figure 3 .
(1) STR is absolutely trusted by all entities. (2) There is a pre-established secure channel between MAG and LMA in the same PMIPv6 domain.
(3) MN and other entities in PMIPv6 domain(LMA, MAG), have no trust relationship. The main goal of the proposed scheme is to establish such trust relationship.
Before elaborating the proposed scheme, the relevant notations and descriptions used in the following sections are shown in Table1.
C. SYSTEM INITIALIZATION
In this phrase, STR generates the system public parameters as follows.
(1) STR selects a cycle additive group G 1 , a cycle multiplicative group G T generated by prime order q respectively, a bilinear pairing e: G 1 × G 1 − → G T , and the generator of G 1 : P. (2) STR sets three secure hash functions:
The system public parameters Para = {G 1 , G T , e, q, P,
In order to obtain the group membership certificate, MN's registration process will be executed as shown in Figure 4 .
(1) MN first randomly selects r MN , N 1 ∈ Z * q , the shared key K MN −STR ∈ {0, 1} l , where l is the length of the key in AES, and multiple x i ∈ Z * q (i = 1 . . . n). Then MN calculates the relevant variables M = {r MN x i P, x i P, r MN P} to apply to join STR's group. Finally, using the public key PK STR of STR, MN encrypts ID MN , N 1 , K MN −STR , and M :
where BF is an identity-based encryption mechanism [19] .
(2) MN sends C MN −STR to STR and applies for registration. 
2) REGISTRATION OF LMA AND MAG
As shown in Figure 5 , LMA and MAG will obtain their own private key through the following registration process. 
E. AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS
In this section, we will elaborate the authentication protocols in proposed scheme: initial access authentication protocol, pre-handover authentication protocol, as well as handover authentication protocol.
1) INITIAL ACCESS AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
When MN first enters the PMIPv6 domain as the scenario depicted in Figure 2 , the following authentication operations will be performed as shown in Figure 6 . (1) MN selects random number N 3 ∈ Z * q , x i P, corresponding certificate Cert MN _i and generates the group signature 
2) PRE-HANDOVER AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
When MN is going to leave the accessed MAG (MAG 1 ) and prepares to handover to a new MAG (MAG 2 ), the prehandover protocol will be executed as shown in Figure. 7.
(1) MN selects Cert MN _i and computes its pseudonym: 
3) HANDOVER AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
As shown in Figure. 2, when MN moves to MAG 2 from MAG 1 , the handover authentication protocol will be performed as depicted in Figure. 8. 
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In order to prove the security of our scheme, we first give a formal security proof of the authentication protocols under SVO logic [23] . Afterwards, we further present some security analysis of the proposed scheme in terms of correctness, anonymity, unforgeability, and reliability.
A. SVO LOGIC SVO logic [23] is a security protocol analysis measure proposed by Syverson and Orschot in 1994. It establishes a reasonable theoretical model for the logical system. In the formal semantics, some concepts are redefined and some limitations in the AT logic [24] are eliminated. SVO logic has been widely adopted for the security proof of specific protocols.
1) SYMBOLS
In order to facilitate the following security proof, the relevant notations and descriptions are given as Table 2 . 
2) INFERENCE RULES AND AXIOMS
There are 2 interference rulus and 20 axioms in SVO logic.
(1) Inference rules: Modus Ponens (MP): From ϕ and ϕ ⊃ ψ infer ψ. Necessitation (Nec): From ϕ infer P believe ϕ.
Axioms
• Believing Ax1: P believes ϕ∧ P believes (ϕ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ P believes ψ Ax2: P believes ϕ ⊃ P believes (P believes ϕ)
• Comprehending Ax13: P believes (P sees F(X )) ⊃ P believes (P sees X )
• Nonce-Verification Ax19: fresh(X ) ∧ P said X ⊃ P says X
• Symmetric goodness of shared keys Ax20: SharedKey(K , P, Q)≡ SharedKey(K , Q, P)
3) FORMAL DESCRIPTION
(1) Initial access authentication protocol 1 
Goals
The main purpose of this protocol is to achieve mutual authentication between MN and MAG 1 . The goals of this protocol can be set as below. (N 3 , N 4 ) MAG 1 believes MN said (N 4 ) From S11, P10, and Ax19, we can get: S12: MN believes MAG 1 says (N 3 , N 4 ) MAG 1 believes MN says (N 4 ) (G 2 is proved) During pre-handover authentication protocol, MN, MAG, and LMA have established trust relationship with each other. Thus it is not necessary to carry out the security proof.
(2)Handover authentication protocol 1 Goals The purpose of the handover authentication protocol is to achieve mutual authentication between MN and the accessed MAG 2 within the same domain. With the help of LMA, MN and MAG 2 establish a trust relationship and generate the shared key. The goals of the handover authentication protocol can be set as below. Besides the security proof of the authentication protocols, the correctness, anonymity, unforgeability, and reliability of the proposed scheme should be further analyzed.
1) CORRECTNESS
Our scheme is based on the signature mechanisms from [21] and [25] to ensure mutual authentication between MN and MAG. In [21] , the correctness of the algorithms have been proved. We make some improvement for the algorithms in [25] . In order to verify the signature σ = SK MN 
3) UNFORGEABILITY
Firstly, only STR can generate and issue the certificate for group members. The adversary cannot generate a legitimate certificate without STR's private key. Therefore, on the basis of the security of private key and shared key, the certificate cannot be forged. Secondly, only credible LMA can issue legitimate pseudonym public key for MN. The pseudonym public key is transmitted through the secure tunnel. If an adversary does not know the shared key between MN and LMA, he cannot get the pseudonym public key, which makes the calculating of pseudonym and the private key impossible. Therefore, on the basis of the security of shared key, legitimate pseudonyms are unforgeable.
4) RELIABILITY
In the initial access authentication, if the adversary does not know the private key of MN and MAG 1 , he cannot calculate the shared key. Meanwhile, if an adversary forged a fake key to sign message, the verifier couldn't verify the signature successfully, thus stop the authentication. During the handover authentication, the adversary cannot generate the legal pseudonym and the corresponding private key, resulting in the inability to generate the legitimate signatures on behalf of MN. At the same time, due to the secure tunnel between MAG 2 and LMA, the adversary cannot disguise as a valid MAG to achieve the authentication with MN through the ciphertext produced by LMA.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we will present the performance analysis of the proposed scheme (AAS) compared with the typical ones: SDGP [15] , CPAS [16] , and PPAS [17] . For the consistency, MU represents MN or OBU, AU represents MAG or RSU in different schemes in this section. The analysis will focus on the computation cost, the communication overhead, as well as the signaling cost.
A. COMPUTATION COST
The computation cost is the computation overhead of each entity during authentication procedure. As MU doesn't have enough computing resource, reducing MU's computation cost is crucial for the authentication efficiency [26] . Thus, in this section, we will mainly focus on the computation cost on MU side. According to [27] and [28] , we can see that the execution time of bilinear pairing and point multiplication operation are thousands times of the symmetric encryption or hash function. Consequently, we ignore the cost of such operations. Meanwhile, some related schemes do not provide the specific signature and encryption mechanisms. In order to keep consistent, we choose BF-IBE [19] and BLS [22] as their cryptographic approaches.
Before the analysis of the computation cost, the relevant notations and descriptions are given in Table 3 . In SDGP, MU verifies TA's signature σ SK TA = (PK AU , Loc AU , h(LOC AU )), then uses AU's public key to encrypt message < FID v , N 1 >.
In CPAS, MU signs a traffic-related message. After receiving the signature from AU, MU verifies the signature.
In PPAS, the main computation cost of MU is 4 point multiplications: R = aPK cc , x = ap, R = a PK RC i , and x = a P.
For AAS, MU adopts BLS [22] Table 4 shows the computation cost of MU of each scheme. According to [29] - [33] , we can get the conclusion: T PM = T EXP = nT RSA , T BP = 2T PM + 1(ms), where n = 0.25 ∼ 1. Figure.9 shows the comparison result of MU's computation cost, where we can see that AAS is the most efficient one.
B. COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
The communication overhead(CO) is defined as the size of total message transmitted during the authentication procedure. According to [34] and [35] , we present the length of the corresponding parameters as table 5.
(1) In SDGP, AU sends the message to MU including AU's public key: PK AU ∈ G 1 , the location of AU: Loc AU , hash result: h(Loc Au ) ∈ Z * q , and the signature: σ SK TA . After receiving the message and verifying the signature from AU, MU sends the public key: PK MU ∈ G 1 Table 6 . 
C. SIGNALING COST
The signaling cost (SC) is defined as the entire amount of authentication signaling costs.We adopt the fluid flow mobility model [37] to evaluate the signaling cost. Moreover, the direction of MN's movement is uniformly distributed in the range of (0, 2π). The subnet (AU) crossing rate(R) and signaling cost are calculated as follows:
where ρ denotes MU's amount per square meter, L means the perimeters of a cell, v is the average velocity, T A−B 
We assume that the transmission between different entities is one hop. Moreover, the wired bandwidth is 10Mbps, the wireless bandwidth is 6Mbps, L = 100m, T BP = 2.5T RSA , T PM = 0.75T RSA . According to (3)∼(6), we can get Figure. 10 and Figure. 11 to demonstrate the signaling cost of the four schemes. With the increase of MN's density and average velocity, it can be seen that AAS has lower signaling cost than the other ones.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose an anonymous authentication scheme based on PMIPv6 for VANETs. The group signature mechanism is combined with vehicular network to improve the security and anonymity of vehicle node(MN). Through the pseudonym obtained from LMA, MN's computation cost is reduced significantly. The security and performance analysis show that the proposed anonymous authentication scheme is secure and performs better than the typical ones in terms of computation cost, communication overhead, as well as signaling cost.
In the future work, we will further reinforce the proposed scheme with the establishment of trust relationship during inter-domain handover authentication. 
